Abstract. Many important system properties, particularly in security and privacy, cannot be verified statically. Therefore, runtime verification is an appealing alternative. Logics for hyperproperties, such as Hyper-LTL, support a rich set of such properties. We first show that black-box monitoring of HyperLTL is in general unfeasible, and suggest a gray-box approach. Gray-box monitoring implies performing analysis of the system at run-time, which brings new limitations to monitorabiliy (the feasibility of solving the monitoring problem). Thus, as another contribution of this paper we refine the classic notions of monitorability, both for trace properties and hyperproperties, taking into account the computability of the monitor. We then apply our approach to monitor a privacy hyperproperty called distributed data minimality, expressed as a HyperLTL property, by using an SMT-based static verifier at runtime.
Introduction
Consider a confidentiality policy ϕ that requires that every pair of separate executions of a system agree on the position of occurrences of some proposition a. Otherwise, an external observer may learn some sensitive information about the system. We are interested in studying how to build runtime monitors for properties like ϕ, where the monitor receives independent executions of the system under scrutiny and intend to determine whether or not the system satisfies the property. While no such monitor can determine whether the system satisfies ϕ-as it cannot determine whether it has observed the whole (possibly infinite) set of traces-it may be able to detect violations. For example, if the monitor receives finite executions t 1 = {a}{}{}{a}{} and t 2 = {a}{a}{}{}{a}, then it is straightforward to see that the pair (t 1 , t 2 ) violates ϕ (the traces do not agree on the truth value of a in the second, fourth, and fifth positions). Now, if we change the policy to ϕ requiring that for every execution there must exist a different one that agrees with the first execution on the position of This is an extended version of a paper presented at the 23rd International Symposium on Formal Methods (FM '19) . This version contains full proofs, a description of the proof-of-concept monitor for DDM, and experimental results that were not included in the original publication.
occurrences of a, the monitor cannot even detect violations of ϕ . Indeed, it is not possible to tell at run-time whether or not for each execution (from a possibly infinite set), there exists a related one. Such properties for which no monitor can detect satifaction or violation are known as non-monitorable.
Monotorability was first defined in [27] as the problem of deciding whether any extension of an observed trace would violate or satisfy a property expressed in LTL. We call this notion semantic black-box monitorability. It is semantic because it defines a decision problem (the existence of a satisfying or violating trace extension) without requiring a corresponding decision procedure. In settings like LTL the problem is decidable and the decision procedures are well-studied, but in other settings, a property may be semantically monitorable even though no algorithm to monitor it exists. This notion of monitorability is "black-box" because it only considers the temporal logic formula to determine the plausibility of an extended observation that violates or satisfies the formula. This is the only sound assumption without looking inside the system. Many variants of this definition followed, mostly for trace logics [19] (see also [5] ).
The definition of semantic monitorability is extended in [1] to the context of hyperproperties [11] . A hyperproperty is essentially a set of sets of traces, so monitoring hyperproperties involves reasoning about multiple traces simultaneously. The confidentiality example discussed above is a hyperproperty. The notion of monitorability for hyperproperties in [1] also considers whether extensions of an observed trace, or of other additional observed traces, would violate or satisfy the property. An important drawback of these notions of monitorability is that they completely ignore the role of the system being monitored and the possible set of executions that it can exhibit to compute a verdict of a property.
trace/hyper black/ gray computability [1, 9, 19] [ 6, 7, 17, 18, 27] [28] In this paper we consider a landscape of monitorability aspects along three dimensions, as depicted in Fig. 1 . We explore the ability of the monitor to reason about multiple traces simultaneously (the trace/hyper dimension). We first show that a large class of hyperproperties that involve quantifier alternations are non-monitorable. That is, no matter the observation, no verdict can ever be declared. We then propose a solution based on a combination of static analysis and runtime verification. If the analysis of the system is completely precise, we call it white-box monitoring. Black-box monitoring refers to the classic approach of ignoring the system and crafting general monitors that provide sound verdicts for every system. In gray-box monitoring the monitor uses an approximate set of executions, given for example as a model, in addition to the observed finite execution. The combination of static analysis and runtime verification allows to monitor hyperproperties of interest, but it involves reasoning about possible executions of the system (the black/gray dimension in Fig. 1 ). This, in turn, forces us to consider the com-putability limitations of the monitors themselves as programs (the computability dimension).
We apply this approach to monitoring a complex hyperproperty of interest in privacy, namely, data minimization. The principle of data minimization (introduced in Article 5 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation [15] ) from a software perspective requires that only data that is semantically used by a program should be collected and processed. When data is collected from independent sources, the property is called distributed data minimization (DDM) [4, 25] . Our approach for monitoring DDM is as follows. We focus on detecting violations of DDM (which we express in HyperLTL using one quantifier alternation). We then create a gray-box monitor that collects dynamically potential witnesses for the existential part. The monitor then invokes an oracle (combining symbolic execution trees and SMT solving) to soundly decide the universally quantified inner sub-formula. Our approach is sound but approximated, so the monitor may give an inconclusive answer, depending on the precision of the static verification.
Contributions. In summary, the contributions of this paper are the following:
(1) A novel richer definition of monitorability that considers monitors as computable programs. For sufficiently rich programming languages, the classic notion of semantically monitorability allows properties for which no monitor can be built (Sect. 3). (2) The combination of static analysis with runtime verification to enhance monitors to be able to give a definitive answer, which allows to monitor, for particular systems, properties that are not monitorable in a black-box fashion. Our static verifier acts as an oracle aiding the runtime monitor to reach a final verdict. (3) We then express DDM as a hyperproperty and apply our technique to it (Sect. 4). We have applied our proof-of-concept implementation to some representative examples and present empirical evaluation (Sect. 5).
Background
Let AP be a finite set of atomic propositions and Σ = 2 AP be the finite alphabet. We call each element of Σ a letter (or an event). Throughout the paper, Σ ω denotes the set of all infinite sequences (called traces) over Σ, and Σ * denotes the set of all finite traces over Σ. For a trace t ∈ Σ ω (or t ∈ Σ * ), t[i] denotes the i th element of t, where i ∈ N. We use |t| to denote the length (finite or infinite) of trace t. Also, t[i, j] denotes the subtrace of t from position i up to and including position j (or if i > j or if i > |t|). In this manner t[0, i] denotes the prefix of t up to and including i and t[i, ..] denotes the suffix of t from i (including i).
Given a set X, we use P(X) for the set of subsets of X and P fin (X) for the set of finite subsets of X. Let u be a finite trace and t a finite or infinite trace. We denote the concatenation of u and t by ut. Also, u t denotes the fact that u is a prefix of t. Given a finite set of finite traces U and an arbitrary set W of finite or infinite traces, we say that W extends U if every trace in U is a prefix of some trace in W . In this case, we write U W , which holds whenever for all u ∈ U , there is a v ∈ W such that u v. Note that every trace in U is extended by some trace in W (we call these trace extensions), and that W may also contain additional traces with no prefix in U (we call these set extensions).
LTL and HyperLTL
We now briefly introduce LTL and HyperLTL. The syntax of LTL [26] is:
where a ∈ AP. The semantics of LTL is given by associating to a formula the set of traces t ∈ Σ ω that it accepts:
We will also use the usual derived operators (Ψϕ ≡ true U ϕ) and (Φϕ ≡ ¬Ψ¬ϕ).
All properties expressible in LTL are trace properties (each individual trace satisfies the property or not, independently of any other trace). Some important properties, such as information-flow security policies (including confidentiality, integrity, and secrecy), cannot be expressed as trace properties but require reasoning about two (or more) independent executions (perhaps from different inputs) simultaneously. Such properties are called hyperproperties [11] . HyperLTL [12] is a temporal logic for hyperproperties that extends LTL by allowing explicit quantification over execution traces. The syntax of HyperLTL is:
ϕ ::= ∀π.ϕ ∃π.ϕ ψ ψ ::= a π ¬ψ ψ ∨ ψ Ωψ ψ U ψ A trace assignment Π : V → Σ ω is a partial function mapping trace variables to infinite traces. We use Π ∅ to denote the empty assignment, and Π[π → t] for the same function as Π, except that π is mapped to trace t. The semantics of HyperLTL is defined by associating formulas with pairs (T, Π) where T is a set of traces and Π is a trace assignment:
The semantics of the temporal inner formulas is defined in terms of the traces associated with each path (here Π[i, ..] denotes the map that assigns π to
We say that a set T of traces satisfies a HyperLTL formula ϕ (denoted T |= ϕ) if and only if T, Π ∅ |= ϕ.
Example 1. Consider the HyperLTL formula ϕ = ∀π.∀π .Φ(a π ↔ a π ) and T = {t 1 , t 2 , t 3 }, where t 1 = {a, b}{a, b}{}{b} · · · , t 2 = {a}{a}{b} · · · and t 3 = {}{a}{b} · · · Although traces t 1 and t 2 together may satisfy ϕ, t 3 does not agree with the other two, i.e., a ∈ t 1 (0), a ∈ t 2 (0), but a / ∈ t 3 (0). Hence, T |= ϕ.
Semantic Monitorability
Runtime verification (RV) is concerned with (1) generating a monitor from a formal specification ϕ, and (2) using the monitor to detect whether or not ϕ holds by observing events generated by the system at run time. Monitorability refers to the possibility of monitoring a property. Some properties are non-monitorable because no finite observation can lead to a conclusive verdict. We now present some abstract definitions to encompass previous notions of monitorability in a general way:
-Observation. We refer to the finite information provided dynamically to the monitor up to a given instant as an observation. We use O and P to denote individual observations and O to denote the set of all possible observations, equipped with an operator O P that captures the extension of an observation. -System behavior. We use B to denote the universe of all possible behaviors of a system. A behavior B ∈ B may, in general, be an infinite piece of information. By abuse of notation, O B denotes the observation O ∈ O can be extended to a behavior B.
Example 2. When monitoring trace properties such as LTL, we have O = Σ * , an observation is a finite trace O ∈ Σ * , O O is the prefix relation on finite strings, and B = Σ ω . When monitoring hyperproperties such as HyperLTL, an observation is a finite set of finite traces O ⊂ Σ * , that is, O = P fin (Σ * ). The relation is the prefix for finite sets of finite traces defined above. That is, O P whenever for all t ∈ O there is a t ∈ P such that t t . Finally, B = P(Σ ω ).
We say that an observation O ∈ O permanently satisfies a formula ϕ, if every B ∈ B that extends O satisfies ϕ:
where |= denotes the satisfaction relation in the semantics of the logic. Similarly, we say that an observation O ∈ O permanently violates a formula ϕ, if every extension B ∈ B violates ϕ:
Monitoring a system for satisfaction (or violation) of a formula ϕ is to decide whether a finite observation permanently satisfies (resp. violates) ϕ.
Definition 1 (Semantic Monitorability).
A formula ϕ is (semantically) monitorable if every observation O has an extended observation P O, such that P |= s ϕ or P |= v ϕ.
A similar definition of monitorability only for satisfaction or only for violation can be obtained by considering only P |= s ϕ or only P |= v ϕ. Instantiating this definition of monitorability for LTL and finite traces as observations (O = Σ * and B = Σ ω ) leads to the classic definitions of monitorability for LTL by Pnueli and Zaks [27] (see also [19] ). Similarly, instantiating the definitions for HyperLTL and observations as finite sets of finite traces leads to monitorability as introduced by Agrawal and Bonakdarpour [1] .
Example 3. The LTL formula ΦΨp is not (semantically) monitorable since it requires an infinite-length observation, while formulas Φp and Ψp are monitorable. Similarly, ∀π.∀π.Φ(a π ↔ ¬a π ) is monitorable, but ∀π.∃π.Φ(a π ↔ ¬a π ) is not, as it requires an observation set of infinite size. We will prove this claim in detail in Sect. 3.
The Notion of Gray-box Monitoring
Most of the previous definitions of monitorability make certain assumptions: (1) the logics are trace logics, i.e. do not cover hyperproperties, (2) the system under analysis is black-box in the sense that every further observation is possible, (3) the logics are tractable, in that the decision problems of satisfiability, liveness, etc. are decidable. We present here a more general notion of monitorability by challenging these assumptions.
The Limitations of Monitoring Hyperproperties
Earlier work on monitoring hyperproperties is restricted to the quantifier alternation-free fragment, that is either ∀ * .ψ or ∃ * .ψ properties. We establish now an impossibility result about the monitorability of formulas of the form ∀π.∃π .ΦF , where F is a state predicate. That is, F is formed by atomic propositions, a π or a π and Boolean combinations thereof, and can be evaluated given two valuations of the propositions from AP, one from each path π and π at the current position. For example, the predicate F = (a π ↔ ¬a π ) for AP = {a} depends on the valuation of a at the the first state of paths π and π . We use v and v in F (v, v ) to denote that F uses two copies of the variables v (one copy from π and another Proof. Let ϕ be ∀π∃π .ΦF . We first observe that if F is serial, then the universal set Σ ω is a model of ϕ, i.e. Σ ω |= ϕ. We show the two directions separately.
-"⇐". Assume that F is non-reflexive and serial, and let U be an arbitrary observation. We show an infinite extension of U that violates ϕ and another infinite extension of U that satisfies ϕ, concluding that no observation has a finite extension that permanently satisfies or violates ϕ, that is, ϕ is not monitorable. As mentioned above, since F is serial, Σ ω is a model of ϕ and Σ ω extends U . Now, assume that all traces in U have the same length (otherwise, extend the shorter traces arbitrarily). Then, pick v such that F (v, v) is false (recall that F is non-reflexive so such a v must exist), and consider the set of infinite observations V = {uvt | u ∈ U, t ∈ Σ ω }. Since v appears at the same position in all strings in B, it follows that B |= ϕ.
-"⇒". If F is reflexive then ϕ holds for every non-empty set of infinite words by picking the same trace for π and π . Therefore ϕ is monitorable (in fact, guaranteed to be permanently satisfied for any observation). Otherwise, assume that F is not serial, so for some v and for all v ,
Consider an arbitrary observation U and extend one u ∈ U into uv. The observation obtained permanently violates ϕ because taking π to be uv cannot be matched at the position where v occurs by any trace for π .
This finishes the proof.
The fragment of ∀∃ properties captured by Theorem 1 is very general. First, the temporal operator is just safety (the result can be generalized for richer temporal formulas). Also, every binary predicate can be turned into a non-reflexive predicate by distinguishing the traces being related. Moroever, many relational properties, such as non-interference and DDM, contain a tacit assumption that only distinct traces are being related. Seriality simply establishes that F cannot be falsified by only observing the local valuation of one of the traces. Intuitively, a predicate that is not serial can be falsified by looking only at one of the traces, so the property is not a proper hyperproperty. The practical consequence of Theorem 1 is that many hyperproperties involving one quantifier alternation cannot be monitored.
Gray-box Monitoring. Sound and Perfect Monitors
To overcome the negative non-monitorability result, we exploit knowledge about the set of traces that the system can produce (gray-box or white-box monitoring). Given a system that can produce the set of system behaviors S ⊆ B, we parametrize the notions of permanent satisfaction and permanent violation to consider only behaviors in S:
Considering these definitions, monitors must now analyze and decide properties of extended observations which is computationally not possible for sufficiently rich system descriptions. We therefore introduce a novel notion of monitor that considers S and the computational power of monitors (the diagonal dimension in Fig. 1) .
A monitor for a property ϕ and a set of traces S is a computable function M : O → { , ⊥, ?} that, given a finite observation O, decides a verdict for ϕ: indicates success, ⊥ indicates failure, and ? indicates that the monitor cannot declare a definite verdict given only u. The following definition captures when a monitor for a property ϕ can give a definite answer.
Definition 2 (Sound monitor). Given a property ϕ and a set of behaviors S, a monitor M is sound whenever, for every observation O ∈ O,
If a monitor is not sound then it is possible that an extension of O forces M to change a to a ⊥ verdict, or vice-versa. The function that always outputs ? is a sound monitor for any property, but this is the least informative monitor. A perfect monitor precisely outputs whether satisfaction or violation is inevitable, which is the most informative monitor.
Definition 3 (Perfect Monitor). Given a property ϕ and a set of traces S, a monitor M is perfect whenever, for every observation O ∈ O,
Obviously, a perfect monitor is sound. Similar definitions of perfect monitor only for satisfaction (resp. violation) can be given by forcing the precise outcome only for satisfaction (resp. violation).
A black-box monitor is one where every behavior is potentially possible, that is S = B. If the monitor uses information about the actual system, then we say it is gray-box. White-box refers to the ability to reason with absolute precision about the set of traces of the system, while gray-box allows for approximate behaviors. In some cases, for example to decide instantiations of a ∀ quantifier, a satisfaction verdict that is taken from S can be concluded for all over-approximations (dually under-approximations for violation and for ∃). For space limitations, we do not give the formal details here.
Using Defs. 2 and 3, we can add the computability aspect to capture a stronger definition of monitorability. Abusing notation, we use O ∈ S to say that the observation O can be extended to a trace allowed by the system.
Definition 4 (Strong Monitorability).
A property ϕ is strongly monitorable for a system S whenever there is a sound monitor M such that, for all observations O ∈ O, there is an extended observation P ∈ S, such that either M (P ) = or M (P ) = ⊥.
A property is monitorable for satisfaction if the extension with M (P ) = always exists (and analogously for violation). In what follows we will use the term monitorability to refer to strong monitorability whenever no confusion may arise. It is easy to see that if a property is not semantically monitorable, then it is not strong monitorable, but in rich domains, some semantically monitorable properties may not be strong monitorable. Lemma 1. If ϕ is strongly monitorable then ϕ is semantically monitorable.
A property may not be monitorable in a black-box manner, but monitorable in a gray-box manner. In the realm of monitoring of LTL properties, strong and semantic monitorability coincide for finite state systems (see [28] ), because model-checking and the problem of deciding whether a state of a Büchi automaton is live are decidable.
Monitoring Distributed Data Minimality
In this section we describe how to monitor DDM, which can be expressed as a hyperproperty of the form ∀ + ∃ + . The negative non-monitotabiliy result from Sect. 3.1 can be generalized to ∀ + ∃ + hyperproperties. In the particular case of DDM, although we mainly deal with the input/output relation of functions and are not concerned with infinite temporal behavior, we still need to handle possibly infinite set extensions S for black-box monitoring. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the following, seemingly contradictory aspects of DDM:
-DDM is not semantically black-box monitorable, -DDM is semantically white-box monitorable (for programs that are not DDM), -checking DDM statically is undecidable, -no perfect monitor exists for DDM for a general system, -DDM is strongly gray-box monitorable for violation, and we give a sound monitor.
The apparent contradictions are resolved by careful analysis of DDM along the different dimensions of the monitorability cube (Fig. 1 ). We will show how to monitor DDM and similar hyperproperties using a graybox approach. In our approach, a monitor can decide at run time the existence of traces using a limited form of static analysis. The static analyzer receives the finite observation O collected by the monitor, but not the future system behavior. Instead it must reason under the assumption that any system behavior in S that is compatible with O, may eventually occur. For example, given an ∃∀ formula, the outer existential quantifier is instantiated with a concrete set U of runtime traces, while possible extensions of U provided by static analysis can be used to instantiate the inner universal quantifier.
DDM Preliminaries
We briefly recapitulate the formal notion of data-minimality from [4] . A function f : I → O is monolithic data-minimal (MDM), if it fulfills either of the following equivalent conditions:
1. the only preprocessor function p : I → I that can be applied to the inputs of f without changing its outputs is the identity function;
Condition 1. is an information-flow-based characterization that can be generalized to more complicated settings in a straightforward fashion. Condition 2. is a purely logical or data-based characterization more suitable for implementation in e.g. a monitor.
MDM is the strongest form of data minimality, where one assumes that all input data is provided by a single source and thus a single preprocessor can be used to minimize the function. If inputs are provided by multiple sources (called a distributed setting) and access to the system implementing f is restricted, it might be impossible to use a single preprocessor. For example, consider a webbased auction system that accepts bids from n bidders, represented by distinct input domains I 1 , . . . , I n , and where concrete bids x i ∈ I i are submitted remotely. The auction system must compute the function m(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = max i {x i }, which is clearly non-injective and, hence, non-MDM. In this case, a single, monolithic minimizer cannot be used since different bidders need not have any knowledge of each other's bids. Instead, bidders must try to minimize the information contained in their bid locally, in a distributed way, before submitting it to the auction.
The problem of distributed data minimization consists in building a collection p 1 , . . . , p n of n independent preprocessors for a function f . Then, one can generalize the (information-flow) notion of data-minimality to the distributed setting as follows. The function f is distributed data-minimal (DDM) if, for every input x i , the only possible preprocessor p i is the identity function. Returning to our example, the maximum function m defined above is DDM. As for MDM, there is an equivalent, data-based characterization of DDM defined next.
Definition 5 (distributed data minimality [4]).
A function f is distributed data-minimal (DDM) if, for all input positions k and all x, y ∈ I k such that x = y, there is some
We use Def. 5 to explore how to monitor DDM. In the following, we assume that the function f : I 1 × · · · × I n → O has at least two arguments (n ≥ 2). Note that for unary functions, DDM coincides with MDM. Since MDM is a ∀ + -property (involving no quantifier alternations), most of the challenges to monitorability discussed here do not apply [25] . We also assume, without loss of generality, that the function f being monitored has only nontrivial input domains, i.e. |I i | ≥ 2 for all i = 1, . . . n. If I i is trivial then this constant input can be ignored. Finally, note that checking DDM statically is undecidable for sufficiently rich programming languages [4] .
DDM as a Hyperproperty
We consider data-minimality for total functions f : I → O. Our alphabet, or set of events, is the set of possible input-output (I/O) pairs of f , i.e. Σ f = I × O.
Since a single I/O pair u ∈ Σ f captures an entire run of f , we restrict ourselves to observing singleton traces, i.e. traces of length |u| = 1. In other words, we ignore any temporal aspects associated with the computation of f . This allows us to use first-order predicate logic-without any temporal modalities-as our specification logic.
DDM is a hyperproperty, expressed as a predicate over sets of traces, even though the traces are I/O pairs. The set of observable behaviors O f of a given f consists of all finite sets of I/O pairs O f = P fin (Σ f ). The set of all possible system behaviors B f = P(Σ f ) additionally includes infinite sets of I/O pairs.
We now express DDM as a hyperproperty, using HyperLTL, but with only state predicates (no temporal operators). Given a tuple x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,
π and π agree on their i-th input,
π and π agree on all but the i-th input Then, we define DDM for input argument i as follows:
In words: given any pair of traces π and π , if π in and π in differ in their i-th position, then there must be some common values z for the remaining inputs, such that the outputs of f for
Note that z does not appear in ϕ i directly, instead it is determined implicitly by the (existentially quantified) traces τ and τ . Finally, distributed data minimality for f is defined as ϕ dm = n i=1 ϕ i . Note that ϕ dm follows the same structure as the logical characterization of DDM from Sect. 4.1. The universally quantified variables range over the possible inputs at position i, while the existentially quantified variables τ and τ range over the other inputs and the outputs. Note also that, given the input coordinates of π, π , and τ , all the output coordinates, as well as the input coordinates of τ , are uniquely determined. 
Properties of DDM
Since ϕ dm is a ∀ + ∃ + property, it should not come as a surprise that it is not semantically black-box monitorable in general.
Lemma 2 (black-box non-monitorability). Assume f : I → O, then ϕ dm is semantically black-box monitorable iff I is finite.
Proof. We first treat the case where I is finite. Assume I and O each contain at least two elements. Smaller I/O domains correspond to degenerate cases for which semantic black-box monitorability is easy to show, so we omit them here.
Let U ⊆ O be a finite set of traces. We need to show that there is a finite extension V U that permanently satisfies or violates ϕ dm . Pick V = Σ f = I ×O. Clearly, this is the largest observation in O, so any property satisfied by V is also permanently satisfied by V . Hence it suffices to show that V |= s ϕ dm . Let u, u , w be arbitrary I/O pairs, o = o ∈ O a pair of distinct outputs, and i an arbitrary input position.
Then u, u and v, v are all in V , and it is easy to check that ϕ i holds if the quantified variables are instantiated to these traces in the given orders. In other words V |= s ϕ i for all i, and hence V permanently satisfies ϕ dm .
Conversely, assume that I is infinite, and let U again be a finite set of traces. To show that U neither permanently satisfies nor permanently violates ϕ dm , it is sufficient to exhibit a pair of extensions T s , T v U that satisfy and violate ϕ dm , respectively. For T s , we pick T s = Σ f = I × O. By the same argument as given above (for the finite case), we have T s |= s ϕ dm . We have to work slightly harder to construct T v . Since I is infinite but U is finite, there must be an input position i and a pair of distinct elements x = x ∈ I i such that no trace in U has x or x as its i-th input. Pick some arbitrary trace w ∈ Σ f , and let v = w[i → x] and v = w[i → x ]. By construction, v, v / ∈ U , so T v = U ∪ {v, v } is a strict extension of U . To show that T v does indeed violate ϕ dm , it is sufficient to show that T v |= v ϕ i . Pick v, v to instantiate π and π . Then proj i (w in ) = x = x = proj i (w in ) by construction, but there is no way to instantiate τ and τ : since they have to agree with π and π on the i-th input position, the only candidates are v and v , but v out = v out by construction.
However, and perhaps more surprisingly, ϕ dm is semantically white-box monitorable for violations. That is, if f is not DDM, there is hope to detect it.
To make this statement more precise, we first need to identify the set of valid system behaviors S f of f . We define Σ # f = {(i, o) | f (i) = o} to be the set of I/O pairs that correspond to executions of f . Then S f = P(Σ # f ) precisely characterizes the set of valid system behaviors. With the extra information that gray-box monitoring affords, we can make more precise claims about properties like DDM: whether or not a property is monitorable may, for instance, depend on whether the property actually holds for the system under scrutiny. Concretely, for the case of DDM, we show the following.
Theorem 2. Given a function f : I → O, the formula ϕ dm is semantically graybox monitorable in S f if and only if either f is distributed non-minimal or the input domain I is finite.
Theorem 2 follows from the following two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 3 (semantic violation).
If f is not DDM, then ϕ dm is semantically monitorable for violation (in S f ).
Proof. Assume a finite set of traces U ∈ S f . We need to show that there is a finite extension V U permitted by S f that permanently violates ϕ dm . First, note that the task is trivial if I is finite: we simply pick V = Σ # f , i.e. the set of all possible executions, which is also finite. The only finite extension of V permitted by S f is the complete set of traces Σ # f itself, and since f is not distributed minimal, ϕ dm cannot hold for Σ # f . Assume instead that I is infinite. Since f is distributed non-minimal, there must be some input position i and some pair of distinct inputs
for an arbitrary z ∈ I. Then any set W ∈ S f that contains the traces u = (y, f (y)) and u = (y , f (y )) violates ϕ dm . To see this, assume instead that W |= s S f ϕ dm . Then there must be traces v, v ∈ W that agree on all but the i-th input, such that
, thus contradicting non-minimality of f . Hence, by picking V = U ∪ {u, u }, we have V |= Proof. First, if I is finite the result follows by picking V = Σ # f . Assume now that f is distributed minimal, ϕ dm is semantically monitorable for satisfaction, and I is infinite. Let U ∈ S f be some non-empty, finite set of traces with some distinguished element u ∈ U . Since ϕ dm is monitorable for satisfaction, there must be a finite extension V U that permanently satisfies ϕ dm . To arrive at a contradiction, it suffices to construct a finite extension W V that does not satisfy ϕ dm .
Pick an input position i for which I i is infinite. Such an i must exist because otherwise I would be the Cartesian product of finite sets, and I is infinite by assumption. Next, pick a pair of distinct element x = x ∈ I i such that there are no traces in V with x or x as their i-th input. Such x, x must also exist because I i is infinite but V is finite. Finally, pick an input position j = i, and a y ∈ I j such that y = proj j (u in ). Such a y must exist for I j to be non-trivial.
. Then w and w are clearly valid traces, i.e. w, w ∈ Σ # f , but w, w / ∈ V since w and w have x and x as their i-th inputs, respectively. Let W = V ∪{w, w }. By construction, ¬ same i (π, π ) holds if we instantiate π and π to w and w , respectively, but there is no pair of traces v, v ∈ W to instantiate τ, τ in such a way that same i (π, τ ), same i (π , τ ) and almost i (τ, τ ) all hold simultaneously. The former force the choice τ → w and τ → w but, by construction, proj j (w in ) = proj j (w in ). Hence W |= s ϕ dm and we arrive at a contradiction.
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 4. Intuitively, Theorem 2 means that f cannot be monitored for satisfaction. Note that the semantic monitorability property established by Theorem 2 is independent of whether we can actually decide DDM for the given f . We address the question of strong monitorability later on in this section.
If I is finite, it is easy to strengthen Theorem 2 by providing a perfect monitor M dm for ϕ dm . Since f is assumed to be a total function with a finite domain, we can simply check the validity of ϕ dm for every trace U ⊆ Σ # f and tabulate the result. To do so, the ∃ and ∀ quantifiers in ϕ dm can be converted into conjunctions and disjunctions over U . Corollary 1. For f : I → O with finite I, ϕ dm is strongly monitorable in S f . If I is infinite, then ϕ dm is not semantically monitorable for satisfaction, but we can still hope to build a sound monitor for violation of ϕ dm .
Building a Gray-box Monitor for DDM
In what follows, we assume a computable function capable of deciding DDM only for some instances. This function, that we call oracle, will serve as the basis for a sound monitor for DDM. This monitor will detect some, but not all, violations of DDM when given sets of observed traces.
Given f :
and assume a total computable function N f,i :
In our practical implementation, we extract ϕ f (i, x, y) from f using symbolic execution, and use an SMT solver to compute N f,i (x, y). We now define a monitor M dm for ϕ dm as follows:
Intuitively, the monitor M dm (U ) checks the set of traces U for violations of DDM by verifying two conditions: the first condition ensures the consistency of U , i.e. that every trace in U does in fact correspond to a valid execution of f ; the second condition is necessary for U not to permanently violate ϕ dm . Hence, if it fails, U must permanently violate ϕ dm . Since N f,i is computable, so is M dm . Note M dm never gives a positive verdict . This is a consequence of the fact that, by Lemma 4, for a general f DDM is not monitorable for satisfaction.
The second condition in the definition of M dm is an approximation of ϕ dm : the universal quantifiers are replaced by conjunctions over the finite set of input traces U , while the existential quantifiers are replaced by a single quantifier ranging over all of Σ # f (not just U ). This approximation is justified formally by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (soundness).
The monitor M dm is sound. Formally,
Proof. The monitor never gives a verdict, so the first half of the theorem (satisfaction) holds vacuously. For the second part (violation), we have
Implementation and Prototype
We have implemented the ideas described in Sect. 4 in a proof-of-concept monitor for DDM called minion. The monitor is based on the symbolic execution API and the SMT backend of the KeY deductive verification system [2, 20] . The KeY API is used to extract logical characterizations of Java programs (their symbolic execution trees), extends them to first-order formulas over sets of observed traces, and check the result using state-of-the-art SMT solvers, such as the Z3 [22, 23] . The minion tool itself is written in the Scala programming language and provides a simple command-line interface (CLI).
Before we describe minion in more detail, we introduce a running example illustrating the principles of both monolithic and distributed data minimality. For an example of monolithic data minimization, first consider the method rate shown in Fig. 2 . The purpose of this method is to compute the baseline rate to be paid by the driver of a vehicle on a toll road. The rate depends on the time of day and the number of passengers in the vehicle. The range of the output is {56, 70, 72, 90}, and consequently the data processor does not need to know the precise hour of the day, nor the exact number of passengers. A vehicle might pass a toll station at any time between 9pm and 5am to be subject to a the higher daytime rates (72, 90), and at any other time to benefit from the lower nighttime rates (56, 70). Also, any vehicle occupied by three or more passengers is eligible to 20% carpool discount. Giving the actual hour and number of passengers violates the principle of data minimality because more information than necessary is collected. Data minimization is the process of ensuring that the range of inputs provided is reduced, such that different inputs result in different outputs. In a distributed setting, the concept of minimization is more complex as input data may be collected from multiple independent sources. Consider the method fee in Fig. 2 . This method computes the total fee for a trip on a toll road, based on the hours at which a vehicle passes three consecutive toll stations, and on the number of passengers in the vehicle. The overall fee depends on the total time spent on the toll road, which is data collected from all three toll stations. In particular, if a vehicle enters a section of the toll road during a low-rate early morning hour, but fails to reach the next station before 9pm, the driver will be charged the more expensive daytime rate for the entire section. Achieving DDM requires to minimize each input parameter individually, which is information collected at each individual toll station. A preprocessor or data minimizer [4] located at any given toll station can easily minimize the individual inputs (hour, passengers) at that station. But an individual minimizer cannot guarantee minimization with respect to the overall fee since it has no information about the input data collected at the other stations. DDM therefore constitutes merely a "best effort" to minimize inputs given the inherently distributed nature of the system.
When running minion on the fee method of the class Toll, the tool builds first the symbolic execution tree. Then, the monitor reads and parses traces from an input file or standard input. Whenever minion parses a new trace, it rechecks the entire set of traces read thus far for violation, thereby supporting both online and offline monitoring. Traces are read from CSV files, where the number and format of the inputs is determined automatically from the method signature. Fig. 3 shows example traces for the fee method. Columns 1-4 correspond to the parameters h1, h2, h3 and p, respectively, while column 5 contains the result computed by fee for the given values.
By default, minion monitors traces for DDM. Thus, when processing the traces given in Fig. 3a , it signals a violation after reading the second line because fee(20, h 2 , h 3 , p) = fee(2, h 2 , h 3 , p) irrespective of the choice of h 2 , h 3 , and p. In contrast, all traces listed in Fig. 3b are accepted by minion since they have been preprocessed by a distributed minimizer. Alternatively, minion can be instructed to monitor traces for monolithic data minimality (MDM) in which case a violation is signaled when processing the last line of Fig. 3b , whereas all traces in Fig. 3c are accepted.
Lazy vs. Eager Monitoring
Perhaps surprisingly, there are cases where minion will detect a violation of DDM whereas it will not detect a violation of MDM. Consider the function f (x, y) = x. Since f simply ignores its second argument, it is clearly neither distributed nor monolithic minimal. When monitoring the pair of traces (1, 2, 1) and (3, 4, 3) for DDM, minion detects a violation because f (x, 2) = f (x, 4) for any choice of x. Note, however, that this situation does not appear among the observed traces since the two values for y in the respective traces differ. The tool reports a violation because a common value for x is found by our oracle when monitoring for DDM. When monitoring for MDM minion does not detect the violation, because in this case there is no need to invoke the oracle.
Whether or not this is the intended behavior of the monitor depends on the assumption of whether the traces are collected from a program f or from the combined program f • p (p being a minimizer). In the latter case, some combinations of inputs may never be observed as the inputs have been minimized. On the other hand, if traces are not considered preprocessed, we may wish to explore the behavior of f more exhaustively. For this purpose, minion can be instructed to monitor a set of traces eagerly for MDM, resp. lazily for DDM. For the former, minion considers not just the observed traces, but any combination of observed input values-even if that combination does not actually correspond to an observed trace. For the latter, minion only considers combinations of inputs originating from traces with the same result value. For example, for the pair of input traces (1, 2, 1) and (3, 4, 3), minion is able to find a violation in eager MDM mode since f (1, 2) = f (1, 4), but not in lazy DDM mode since f (1, 2) = f (3, 4).
Loops and loop Invariants
In our current implementation, we have only considered simple programs whose control flow does not include loops or recursive calls. Monitoring programs with loops for data minimality is more challenging, as illustrated by method posDiv given in Fig. 4 , which implements integer division by repeatedly subtracting y from x and counting how many times this is possible. Our simple symbolic tree method cannot extract a complete logical characterization of posDiv automatically. Instead, we propose two options:
(i) to obtain an approximate characterization by unrolling the loop to a fixed depth; (ii) to annotate loop invariants, which allows KeY's symbolic execution engine to merge the different execution paths and give a complete characterization of the method.
Both of these options are implemented in minion. In the first case, choosing large values for unrolling leads to high symbolic execution times but lower values may affect accuracy. If the number of loop iterations n at runtime remains below the number of unrolls m, the resulting logical characterization is exact but if n > m the characterization becomes an over-approximation and the the monitor may fail to detect non-minimal traces 6 .
These false negatives can be avoided by annotating loops with loop invariants, shown in Fig. 4 using JML. This invariant specifies that at every loop iteration the remainder r is positive and, when added to the iteration counter q times the divisor y, equals the original dividend x. With this invariant, the symbolic execution terminates quickly and without cutting off any branches, and minion is able to extract a logical characterization for posDiv, which asserts that the eventual result q of the method must satisfy the equation qy = x − r for some r such that 0 ≤ r < y. This is sufficient to correctly monitor any traces generated from posDiv for violation of DDM. We evaluated the performance of minion on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 16 GB of memory, running macOS 10.14. The results are summarized in Table 1 . We run minion on four Java methods: the fee method from Fig. 2 (T1) , a variant of that method that computes the fee on a road with only two toll stations instead of three (T2), as well as the CreditApp (CA) and LoyaltyApp (LA) benchmarks introduced in [3] .
Performance evaluation
Each method was monitored for DDM violation using three kinds of input traces:
(K1) random input values that respect the input specifications of the methods; (K2) traces from (K1) minimized using a distributed data minimizer (DDMin); (K3) traces from (K1) minimized using a monolithic data minimizer (MDMin).
The traces shown in Fig. 3 are subsets of the inputs generated for T1. We generated 10 instances of each kind, accounting for a total of 30 trace sets, each containing exactly 100 traces. Table 1 shows the mean running time and standard deviation in seconds, as well as the verdicts produced by minion. The second column of the table reports the time spent by the symbolic execution. T1 incurs in higher running times because T1 features several multiply-nested branches. The remaining columns report the execution times and verdict of the actual monitor.
The performance of eager and lazy monitoring is similar on random (K1) inputs because all cases have (finite) small input and output domains. As expected, the verdicts for the DDMin (K2) traces are inconclusive since DDM is not monitorable for satisfiability in general (by Lemma 4) . Lazy monitoring does consistently better than eager monitoring on DDMin (K2) inputs, though the differences are relatively small for T1, T2 and CA because the ranges of these methods are small (< 10 elements). There is a bigger difference for LA, where the range is larger.
The performance of lazy monitoring on MDMin traces (K1) is consistently better than on DDMin traces (K2) because lazy DDM monitoring and MDM monitoring coincide for MDMin traces (no SMT invocations are necessary). On the other hand, the performance of eager monitoring for MDMin traces may change drastically depending on whether or not the traces are also DDMin (which need not be the case). If they are, then eager monitoring has the same performance for MDMin traces as for DDMin traces. If they are not, the eager monitor might detect a violation early in the input set, cutting the overall execution time.
6 Related Work LTL Monitorability. Pnueli and Zaks [27] introduced monitorability as the existence of extension of the observed traces that permanently satisfy or violate an LTL property. It is known that the set of monitorable LTL properties is a superset of the union of safety and co-safety properties [6, 7] and that it is also a super set of the set of obligation properties [16, 17] . Havelund and Peled [19] introduce a finer grain taxonomy distinguishing between always finitely satisfiable (resp. refutable), and sometimes finitely satisfiable where only some prefixes are required to be monitorable (for satisfaction). This is a new dimension in the monitorability cube in Fig. 1 which we will study in the future. While all the notions mentioned above ignore the system, predictive monitoring [28] considers the traces allowed in a given finite state system. Monitoring HyperLTL. Monitoring hyperproperties was first studied in [1] , which introduces the notion of monitorability for HyperLTL [13] and gives an algorithm for a fragment of alternation-free HyperLTL. This is later generalized to the full fragment of alternation-free formulas using formula rewriting in [10] , which can also monitor alternating formulas but only with respect to a fixed finite set of finite traces. Finally, [18] proposes an automata-based algorithm for monitoring HyperLTL, which also produces a monitoring verdict for alternating formulas, but again for a fixed trace set. The complexity of monitoring different fragments of HyperLTL was studied in detail in [8] . The idea of grey-box monitoring for hyperproperties, as a means for handling non-monitoriable formulas, was first proposed in [9] .
Data minimization. A formal definition of data minimization and the concept of data minimizer as a pre-processor appear in [4] , which introduces the monolithic and distributed cases. Minimality is closely related to information flow [14] . Malacaria et al. [21] present a symbolic execution-based verification of non-interference security properties for the OpenSSL library. We have in this paper focused on a version of distributed minimization which is not monitorable in general. For stronger versions (cf. [4] ), [25] shows that monitorability for satisfaction is not possible, but it is for violation. This paper also introduces an RV approach for similar safety hyperproperties for deterministic programs.
Conclusions
We have rephrased the notion of monitorability considering different dimensions, namely (1) whether the monitoring is black-box or gray-box, (2) whether we consider trace properties or hyperproperties, and (3) taking into account the computatibility aspects of the monitor as a program. We showed that many hyperproperties that involve quantifier alternation are non-monitorable in a black-box manner and propose a technique that involves inspecting the behaviors of the system. In turn, this forces to consider the computability limitations of the monitor, which leads to a more general notion of monitorability.
We have considered distributed data minimality (DDM) and expressed this property in HyperLTL, involving one quantifier alternation. We then presented a methodology to monitor violations of DDM, based on a model extracted from the program being monitored in the form of its symbolic execution tree, and an SMT solver. We have a implemented a tool (minion) and applied it to a number of representative examples to assess the feasibility of our approach.
As future work, we plan to extend the proposed methodology for other hyperproperties, particularly in the concurrent and distributed setting. We are also planning to use bounded model checking as our verifier at run-time by combining over-and under-approximated methods to deal with universal and existential quantifiers in HyperLTL formulas. Another interesting problem is to apply gray-box monitoring for hyperproperties with real-valued signals (e.g., HyperSTL [24] ).
